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IMPLEMENTING A PARADIGM SHIFT:  IMPLEMENTING THE 
CRPD IN THE CONTEXT OF MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 
 
Peter Bartlett 
 
 
Abstract:  The passage of the CRPD in 2006 promises a paradigm shift in the rights of 
people with disabilities.  Implementing this paradigm shift is a major undertaking requiring 
the involvement of a wide range of stakeholders.  The required reforms extend across the 
legal landscape, and attainment of any consensus on many reforms may take many years in 
some areas.  In the interim, people with disabilities remain subject to situations that are 
indefensible in human rights terms, whether that is understood in the pre- or post-CRPD 
paradigm.  This creates a set of dilemmas:  how do human rights advocates argue for the 
amelioration of manifest abuses in the short to mid-term without undermining the underlying 
WUDQVIRUPDWLYH SURPLVH RI WKH &53'¶V QHZ SDUDGLJP DQG KRZ LV WKH SUHVVXUH RQ VWDWHV
parties to be maintained in the long process of finding ways fully to implement the CRPD?  
These difficulties are discussed in the context of laws relating to mental disability, both in 
general and with particular reference to the revisions to the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners (SMR) now under consideration. 
 
Introduction 
 
[F]or 650 million persons around the world living with disabilities, today promises to 
be the dawn of a new era -- an era in which disabled people will no longer have to 
endure the discriminatory practices and attitudes that have been permitted to prevail 
for all too long.1 
 
We all rejoiced when the CRPD was passed in 2006, with its promise of a paradigm 
shift in the human rights of people with disability.  People with disabilities are to be full and 
participating members of society, able to make their own choices and live their own lives ± 
heady promises indeed. Non-discrimination, the order of the day, is buttressed with 
expectations of meaningful reasonable accommodation to allow the aspirations of people 
with disabilities to be made real in all aspects of life. The problems related to disability were 
articulated as flowing from social responses, not as intrinsic to the people with disabilities 
themselves. 
 
After the party, we now face the morning after ± the bleary hangover of 
implementation, a process that will take many years. This is, of course, a problem with any 
new treaty, but the CRPD is meant to be not merely a new treaty but a new paradigm. Where 
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the traditional view of treaties is that they consolidate previous developments in international 
ODZDFRQVLGHUDEOHDVSHFWRIWKH&53'¶VLPSRUWDQFHLVLWVEUHDNZLth previous international 
law. For example, far from being a guide to the interpretation of the CRPD, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture expressly 
identified the UN Mental Illness Principles2 as no longer reliable statements of international 
law because of their inconsistencies with the CRPD.3 The impetus for the CRPD was not that 
the existing law required consolidation; it was that existing law was not working for people 
with disabilities, and that something new was required. 
 
The CRPD thus opens up a new range of possibilities, but at the same time, this 
creates particular difficulties for implementation.  Consistent with its role as a convention, the 
CRPD provides the human rights standards and values of this brave new world into which we 
are venturing; but also quite properly for a convention, it does not generally provide specific 
requirements as to how those values are to be implemented. Individual States Parties must 
determine this consistently with their own legal and political cultures. This paper will argue 
below that conceptualisation of specific forms of legal regulation to implement the values in 
the CRPD are in their infancy. New forms of law require development and testing in the 
contexts in which they will be implemented. All that takes time.  
 
Further, while the community of people with disabilities may have taken up the new 
paradigms contained in the CRPD, many people in the remainder of the population have not.  
Meaningful change on the ground cannot be introduced by administrative fiat: the new 
DSSURDFKHVPXVWEHµRZQHG¶E\WKHSHRSOHZKRDGPLQLVWHUWKHPRQWKHJURXQG if they are to 
be successful. For matters such as reasonable accommodation in housing, employment, and 
social inclusion, that means ownership by the bulk of the population. That is primarily a 
political process rather than a legal one, and that, too, will take time.  
 
In this period of transition, what should our advocacy look like? We cannot simply 
say that we will force the new ideas onto domestic governments and the body politic of the 
States Parties. First, we do not always yet know what specific laws we would demand, and 
second, without the support of the governed, laws cannot succeed.  It is equally unacceptable 
however to say that we will leave things as they are until the relevant legal interpretations are 
agreed upon. People with disabilities have been told for decades that WKH\ DUH QH[W \HDU¶V
priority. Under any standards, people with disabilities face unacceptable human rights 
violations in many countries of the world. Allowing the CRPD to become an excuse to delay 
improvements while we wait for the perfect, near-perfect, or consensus legal models of 
implementation to arise would be reprehensible. 
 
The result leaves us in a practical dilemma. Following the old paradigms of human 
rights law to improve the human rights of people with disabilities may be more attainable in 
the short to mid-term because those paradigms enjoy greater acceptance among a wider range 
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of stakeholders in many countries. This may make real improvements in the lives of people 
with disabilities in those countries. Reliance on these old paradigms however provides them 
with a credibility and status that may undercut the ongoing political efforts to implement the 
new paradigm. At the same time, waiting for a consensus on how to proceed under the new 
CRPD paradigms is reached may take years if not decades, leaving people with disabilities in 
indefensible conditions in the interim. 
 
There are multiple questions that result from this situation: 
 
x How do we keep the heat on governments and other actors to ensure that the 
developmental work occurs and that the paradigm shift promised by the CRPD does 
actually occur?  The CRPD is likely to be a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to make 
significant changes in the way people with disabilities are dealt with in law and policy 
and in the community; it is too important to let slip. 
x How do we work to prepare the political ground so that the legislative developments 
WR LPSOHPHQW WKH &53' DUH µRZQHG¶ QRW RQO\ E\ WKH FRPPXQLWLHV RI SHRSOH ZLWK
disabilities but also by lawmakers, the people who will be administering the new law, 
and the public at large? 
x Pending those changes, how do we work to improve the lives of people with 
disabilities without undercutting the larger project of social and legal change called 
for by the CRPD? 
x A volume of papers compiled by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture 
establishes that it is appropriate to ask what sorts of steps that office and other 
international bodies like it ought to be taking to further the above points. 
 
This paper examines these tensions in the context of mental disability law.  It does not 
purport to provide definitive answers or a doctrinaire way forward.  It is intended instead to 
open discussion on the subject.   
 
Mental Disability Law as a Case Study 
 
Mental disability law provides a particularly good case study on this problem.  There 
can be little doubt that implementation of the CRPD requires fundamental changes to most 
VWDWHV¶PHQWDOGLVDELOLW\ODZ 
 
First, the CRPD requires social integration of people with disabilities through, for 
example, the provision of community living (Art 19), education (Art 24), and employment 
opportunities (Art 27).  Express rights are provided to social and political integration (Arts 
29, 30).  While their inclusion in a formal convention relating to disability is, of course, 
significant, these Articles can be seen as a development of previous international instruments 
and good practice and should not, therefore, be controversial.  They do not, however, reflect 
the current reality in which people with mental disabilities (be they developmental or 
psychosocial disabilities) live; in much of the world, large closed institutions remain the main 
mode of care.  Often, those institutions often lack adequate conditions regarding, for 
example, the physical state of the institutions; healthcare provision; the availability of 
adequate food, clothing, and warmth; social contacts with the outside world; educational and 
other rehabilitation facilities and programmes; and assuring the safety of inhabitants.4   
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 Regarding the conditions in such institutions, see, for example, the reports of the U.N. Subcomm. for the 
Prevention of Torture, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/opcat/spt_visits.htm, and, for 
 7KHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKHVHµXQFRQWURYHUVLDO¶DVSHFWVRIWKH&53'ZLOOWKHUHIRUHEH
a significant change in the way mental disability is considered in many countries.  The 
experience of countries with systems of community living is, however, that such systems take 
time to develop. This includes both obtaining the physical community housing for previously 
institutionalised people to move into and also developing the social services structures to 
provide the systems of support that will make such moves practical.  Even if the political will 
exists to implement community living, and often it does not, there will be a significant period 
of transition in which many people will be living in the institutions. 
 
On the above issues, the CRPD is relatively clear in its terms and requirements 
(although even regarding deinstitutionalisation, the nature of the social services that are 
required for the people now living in the community is not entirely clear). On other key 
issues relevant to mental disability law, however, the CRPD is ambiguous. Based on the 
GUDIWLQJ KLVWRU\ $UWLFOH ¶V ULJKW WR LQWHJULW\ DSSHDUV WR EH LQWHQGHG DW OHDVW LQ part to 
address the use of medication under compulsion. The actual wording of Article 17 can be 
viewed as the result of failed negotiations; the drafting committee debated detailed wordings 
but did not agree upon any of them.5 The wording in the Convention therefore merely 
SURYLGHVDULJKWWRµLQWHJULW\¶7KLVULJKWGRHVQRWH[LVWSHUVHLQRWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZVR
there is no established canon of interpretation. The result is unsatisfactory. Freedom from 
enforced medication is a vital human rights issue for people with mental disabilities 
(particularly, but not exclusively, psychosocial disabilities), but it may well be many years 
before a settled view as to what this article means is reached.  Further, the degree to which 
the article extends into matters beyond medication remains entirely unclear. 
 
While this is a particularly clear example of interpretive ambiguity, it is by no means 
the only one. The right to equality before the law (Art 12) addresses issues of incapacity ± 
issues that are of tremendous importance to people with mental disabilities ± but it is not 
entirely clear what it requires.  At times, it seems to preclude any form of decision-making on 
behalf of others (Art 12(2)), but at other points, it is more ambiguous (Art 12(4)). 
Additionally, there is the broad interpretive question of the extent to which the CRPD 
provides new rights (clearly sometimes yes ± eg., Art 17), and how far it instead is intended 
to ensure the equal application of existing rights to people with disabilities (and what, 
precisely, that means).   
 
The early interpretations of the CRPD establish that it has a considerable impact on 
the traditional centre of mental health law. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
has stated that CRPD compliance requires the demise of compulsory detention on the basis of 
mental disability: mental health acts as we know them have to go.6  Similarly, criminal 
defences based on mental disorders ± long a staple of criminal law ± are viewed as 
inconsistent with the CRPD.7 Legal regimes that base findings of incapacity on mental 
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disability must change their laws,8 if indeed capacity can be used as a legal concept at all.  
The Special Rapporteur on Torture has called into question the use of psychiatric medication 
without the consent of the patient.9 All of these would require fundamental changes in the 
legal provisions of virtually every country, and there is no suggestion that politicians, 
political and professional stakeholders, or the public are ready to countenance these 
changes.10   
 
Notwithstanding the merits of such interpretations, sufficiently developed concepts 
and legislative models are not in place for legal reform to reflect the new paradigm. Which 
legal powers should be entirely abolished and which maintained in a fashion that makes them 
applicable to the population as a whole rather than just to people with mental disabilities?  It 
does seem that current laws that allow intervention to stop people with mental disabilities 
from injuring themselves but do not permit such intervention for people without disabilities 
are discriminatory; but it may be the case that we would wish to amend the law not to abolish 
the power but, in some circumstances, to extend it to the population as a whole. No thought 
has been given to what those circumstances might be, how to define them, or indeed if such a 
way forward is desirable at all.  Similarly, while it seems obvious that many laws relating to 
mental capacity must change radically, there is no consensus as to what a new law would 
look like. Certainly, any express reference to mental disability as a prerequisite to a finding of 
incapacity seems in violation of the CRPD, but can a capacity-based system of law that is 
disability-neutral on its face be developed in such a way as not to affect people with mental 
disabilities disproportionately, and therefore avoid indirect discrimination?  Thinking in such 
areas is in its infancy, and even the systems that have been developed, such as that by Bach 
and Kerzner,11 have not been subjected to field trials; we do not know what will happen if we 
implement them.   
 
Indeed, the reports noted above contain their own difficulties in this regard. The UN 
High Commissioner makes a point of noting that the abolition of conventional mental health 
law should not be taken to preclude the possibility that people would be preventively 
detained; merely that it should not be done on the basis of disability. This is a surprising 
FRPPHQW&DQLWUHDOO\EHWKH+LJK&RPPLVVLRQHU¶VYLHZWKDWDVWDWXWHDOORZLQJGHWHQWLRQRI
people based on, for example, perceived dangerousness would be consistent with human 
rights? The difficulty of prediction in this area makes this a startling view; indeed, it is these 
difficulties of prediction that have made dangerousness a controversial detention criterion in 
mental health law for many years. For such a system to be credible for the general population, 
it would at the very least require immense forensic research and public debate.   
 
This serves as a reminder that disability law does not exist in its own bubble. Changes 
to disability law raise issues in other legal contexts, including other human rights contexts.  It 
is all very well to say that the insanity defence is discriminatory, for example, but criminal 
FRQYLFWLRQRISHRSOHZKRODFNµUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶LVQRWPHUHO\DTXHVWLRQRIGLVDELOLW\ODZEXW
also of criminal theory more generally. Certainly, domestic law must comply with the CRPD, 
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but the result must also make sense in the context of the theory of criminal law. If it is 
expected that the new structures will not merely be neutral on their face but also will lack a 
discriminatory effect based on disability, that is likely to be a fiercely complex undertaking. 
 
At the same time, the human rights violations to which people with mental disabilities 
are subject are legion:  enforced treatment with powerful drugs, detention based on 
SURVSHFWLYH GDQJHURXVQHVV WR VHOI RU RWKHUV RU µLQ WKHLU RZQ LQWHUHVWV¶ DQG UHPRYDO RI
decision-making authority through the use of guardianship legislation are three of the most 
obvious examples.  Even with reference to the pre-CRPD paradigms, these often occur with 
inadequate legal oversight to ensure compliance with existing domestic law, which is itself 
often inadequate. These examples are before one even begins to consider social and economic 
rights such as rights to adequate healthcare, to employment, to social inclusion, and to proper 
community housing. All these issues are pressing and must be addressed as a matter of 
urgency. They cannot wait while the larger legal debates occur as to how to re-structure 
society in a non-discriminatory way despite how important those debates may be. 
 
Implementation Possibilities 
 
1. Preparing the Ground for Reform 
 
The disability communities and others in the human rights community were first to 
interpret the CRPD, and a variety of strong interpretations have, therefore, entered the 
mainstream legal discourse. The reports of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
and the Special Rapporteur on Torture noted above are particularly clear examples of these 
and have been particularly helpful in establishing an agenda for change. 
 
Divergent interpretations, however, are now beginning to appear.  Some place the 
CRPD in the context of the international law that came before, and are thus more 
conservative in their approach. Others are based on restrictive readings of the wording of the 
Convention itself. Some medical professionals, for example, view psychosocial disabilities as 
µLOOQHVVHV¶UDWKHUWKDQGLVDELOLWLHVDQGWKHLUYLHZSRints are, therefore, outside the scope of the 
Convention. This reading effectively slips through the back door the medical model of 
disability back into the discourse. Others take the view that the definition of disability in the 
CRPD is triggered only when social responses to impairments result in adverse impacts and, 
therefore, that the CRPD does not apply to the impairment absent the social element.  If given 
credence, this too would significantly restrict the effect of the Convention.   
 
Divergent interpretations were bound to arise, and we must engage with them. 
Sometimes, this will be by way of direct challenge to an interpretation that is not consistent 
with the text or is not supported by the standard canons of legal interpretation, and this is one 
place where official international officials and organisations, including but not limited to the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, should use their influence to ensure that interpretations are 
supported by the Convention itself. It must however be acknowledged that the early 
articulations do not have a monopoly on the interpretation of the Convention:  we are at a 
stage where we must accept the wording of the CRPD as it is and not as we wish it had been. 
Similarly, no individual or organisation has a monopoly on interpretation of the Convention 
apart from the CRPD Committee. New interpretations open up new meanings.  Some of those 
will be viewed by human rights and disability activists as helpful and some not, but that is the 
nature of international human rights law. 
 
Engagement with key stakeholders will be essential in any event. For the CRPD to 
have effect, the body politic as a whole, including all stakeholder groups, need to own it. 
Insofar as it is possible, there needs to be one integrated conversation regarding CRPD 
implementation, not a multitude of discussions in isolation from each other. Just talking to 
our friends is not sufficient. Certainly, service users and service user organisations must be 
central throughout the conversation, both because that is right and because it is required by 
the CRPD itself; but if change is going to be effective, it is necessary to both talk and listen to 
the diversity of stakeholders and the broader body politic. 
 
2. Developing Reform Possibilities 
 
As noted, the process of reforming domestic law has barely begun.  Some work has 
been done on possible developments relating to legal capacity and Article 12, but it is still at 
a relatively early stage. Little if any work appears to have been done on other key issues 
relating to mental disability law, such as reform of criminal law and of mental health law. 
These involve major re-organisations of existing legal structures, and appropriate reforms 
will arise only after considerable effort.  It is appropriate that the CRPD Committee recognise 
this.  While it is realistic to expect that implementation of this sort of major reform may take 
considerable time, it is reasonable for the Committee to insist on evidence that the process is 
taking place. Absent such a process, reform never occurs. 
 
While this is the case for legal reform, it is also the case for new policy. As noted 
above, countries that have moved to systems of care in the community have experienced that 
it takes time to get programmes right. While it is reasonable to expect some time to be taken, 
it is equally reasonable to insist that concrete steps be evidenced promptly and throughout the 
reform process that appropriate reforms are actually occurring. 
 
Once again, this will involve discussions with stakeholders across a wide range of 
legal and policy fields. At the moment, it is questionable whether this is occurring. For 
example, for implementation of the right to community living, housing lawyers and 
academics must start to see the CRPD as integral to their work, and the developments in 
criminal law will require a similar commitment from criminal law practitioners and 
academics. It is not obvious that this cross-fertilisation is occurring to any significant degree, 
and that is a significant problem if the CRPD is to have actual effect. It would be appropriate 
for the CRPD Committee to require information on what national programmes are in place to 
drive these changes forward. 
 
3. Developing Measures toward Full Implementation 
 
Some elements of the CRPD will take time to implement. The rights to community 
living, to education, to adequate standards of living, and to social integration, for example, 
will take time to reach full realisation. 7RRRIWHQKRZHYHUµSURJUHVVLYHUHDOLVDWLRQ¶EHFRPHV
a justification for states to do nothing. In principle, developing measures to monitor the 
implementation of these rights is not difficult:  how many people with disabilities are in 
community living (and how many in institutional environments); how many in what sort of 
education; how many in employment; what standard of living is provided for those without 
employment; how many are participating in broader society more generally?   
 
Consistent with Article 31 of the CRPD, the CRPD Committee should insist on the 
collection of this information. It is not their sole responsibility, however. The issues in 
question overlap with the mandates of other international bodies. Those bodies should be 
expected to be active in pressing for implementation of the CRPD as relevant to their 
mandates. 
 
This may, sometimes, involve a re-assessment of the mandates of these organisations.  
The United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
'HJUDGLQJ7UHDWPHQWRU3XQLVKPHQW³637´IRUH[DPSOHKDVWHQGHGWR view its mandate on 
inspections as focused on the conditions of detention. These are of tremendous importance 
for people with mental disabilities, as for anyone else.The provision of appropriate 
programmes for people with mental disabilities in prisons; the availability of appropriate 
physical health care for people with mental disabilities; the provision of appropriate standards 
of food, heat, and other necessaries; and the provision of reasonable accommodation within 
the meaning of Article 5 of the CRPD to people with mental (and other) disabilities really do 
matter. They are not, however, the only issues in these facilities. Too frequently, the life of a 
person with mental disabilities starts with early institutionalisation where inadequate 
education, care, and social integration are provided. Upon attaining adulthood, the individual 
is unable to be integrated into the community and is therefore moved to an institution for 
adults where they may remain for the rest of their life (or may, upon reaching old age, be 
again moved to yet another institution, this time for old people). This pattern of 
institutionalization is itself an example of inhuman or degrading treatment, and that violation 
is not dependent on the quality of the food or the other matters currently viewed as central to 
the mandate of the SPT and similar bodies. Bodies of this type need to understand their 
mandates as extending to the inappropriate institutionalisation of people with disabilities.  
They need to be asking questions about the provision of community alternatives to 
institutional care. The damaging effects of inadequate care, particularly for children, are well-
known; this is not a case where there is much by way of dispute. Certainly, the development 
of alternative models of care takes time, but the failure of international bodies to probe into 
the development of those alternatives amounts to collusion in the human rights violation 
itself. 
 
4. The Contextual Complexity of Reform in the Here and Now 
 
As noted, there are situations where reform cannot wait for the grand projects 
envisaged by the CRPD. Sometimes this occurs in particularly serious cases involving people 
with disabilities ± the provision of particularly intrusive forms of medical treatment without 
consent, for example - and sometimes it involves broader human rights reforms where the 
rights of persons with disabilities are significant but not the only relevant issue. 
 
Further, reform does not occur in the abstract, but on the ground, in the context of 
existing environments and institutions.  As with the issues of legal reform noted above, the 
issues that arise are not merely geographically and socially specific, but they may also raise 
issues in fields beyond disability. Like the legal issues discussed above, they may involve 
human rights situations that are pressing and immediate, where precise requirements of the 
CRPD may yet be unclear, and where those charged with reform may have little experience 
in international law of disability, and may not intuitively support its objectives. The precise 
direction of reform in such situations may be unclear, and even if clear, may not be politically 
achievable. Even if politically achievable, such reforms may not be implemented on the 
ground, through intransigence or hostile incomprehension of people in the system. Approach 
to reform in these situations is, therefore, complex. How does one provide reforms that 
address the immediate needs of people with disabilities without undermining the greater 
reforming vision of the CRPD? 
 
A concrete example of the difficulties can be seen in the current reform processes 
relating to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
(SMR). The SMR are a core text relating to standards of detention for individuals and are 
routinely referred to in much of the world. They are a floor for human rights, designed to 
provide basic standards of protection both in the developed world and in countries that have 
minimal traditions of such safeguards and minimal resources available for compliance.  
Conditions of detention in prisons and similar criminal facilities are of considerable 
importance to people with disabilities in general and to people with mental disabilities in 
particular: people with developmental and psychosocial disabilities are encountered 
frequently in prisons and similar criminal justice institutions, and may be particularly singled 
out for bullying or violence in those environments. Too frequently, little if any regard is paid 
to the needs that flow from their disabilities. 
 
The purpose of the current discussion is not to argue for what changes are or are not 
appropriate to the SMR as they relate to people with disabilities; others are engaged in that 
exercise.12 Instead, the object is to articulate the sorts of tensions that arise when choosing 
advocacy positions in the context of an important issue that includes but also extends beyond 
people with disabilities. 
 
The SMR are an instructive example for current purposes. They are an example where 
serious human rights violations relating to persons with mental disabilities are occurring, 
whether one articulates those according to pre- or post-CRPD paradigms. At the same time, 
the rules involve not just prisoners with disabilities but also prisoners as a whole, and the 
disability-related issues are, therefore, not free-standing; they must sit within the overall rules 
relating to prison governance. 
 
Certainly, some changes can and should be introduced into the SMR that are entirely 
consistent with the CRPD.  Non-discrimination, including the requirement of the provision of 
reasonable accommodation, consistent with Article 5 of the CRPD should be included.  
Those requirements of reasonable accommodation should be clearly articulated to establish 
that all persons with disabilities should have access to the reformative programmes of the 
prison. Other amendments are consistent both with the CRPD and other pre-existing 
international law and practice. Thus protections regarding consent to health interventions are 
certainly required by Art 25 of the CRPD, but also by other international law. Given the 
interpretation provided by the Special Rapporteur on Torture it is at least arguable that 
restrictions on the use of solitary confinement and restraints (including chemical restraints) 
                                                          
12
 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on Torture, Interim Report, supra note 3; Report on the Meeting of the Expert 
Group on the Standard of Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners held in Buenos Aires from 11 to 13 
December 2012, U.N. Doc. UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2012/4 (Dec. 13, 2012); Comm. on Crime Prevention & 
Criminal Justice, Proposal of the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, United States of America, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela, U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/2013/CRP.6 (Apr. 10, 2013); Expert Meeting at the University of 
Essex on the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners Review: Summary, U.N. 
Doc.UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2012/NGO/1 (Nov. 20, 2012); World Network of Users and Survivors of 
Psychiatry, Statement to the Second Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting on the Review of the Standard 
Minimum Rules of on the Treatment of Prisoners, U.N. Doc. UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.6/2012/NGO/5/Add.1 (Dec. 
11, 2012). 
 
are now required, although other international protocols (eg., the Istanbul Protocol on the use 
and effects of solitary confinement) are actually clearer on the point. 
 
Other points are more problematic. ,GHDOO\ DQG FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH &53'¶V
requirements of non-discrimination and reasonable accommodation, people with mental 
disabilities in these environments should have specific programmes and support provided to 
ensure that they can benefit from the rehabilitative programmes of the prison. They would be 
housed in the general population where they would be accepted as part of the prison 
community and where appropriate supports would be in place to meet their needs and ensure 
their freedom from exploitation, violence, and abuse. Medical care would be available to 
them, based on free and informed consent, fully to meet their needs and on a basis equivalent 
to that available to the general public.Tailored educational programmes would be made 
available for them to develop fully in preparation for taking their place without 
discrimination in the community once their debt to society is paid. 
 
In wealthy countries with a history of advocacy relating to mental disability, this 
vision has much to recommend it. These countries should be pushed hard to bring about these 
conditions. The reality is, however, that this grand vision is unrealistic for the vast bulk of the 
world. This is partly for financial reasons: the vision noted above is not inexpensive to 
introduce, and many countries in the world cannot afford it.  It also implies a mentality about 
prisons that is not necessarily shared internationally. While a philosophy of rehabilitation 
may enjoy broad support among human rights theorists, it is less obvious that it is always 
supported by the public, prison administrations and staff, and politicians. These actors are 
more likely to view prisons as places where prisoners are subject to hierarchical controls and 
where their rights are removed. This ethos is difficult to integrate with the empowerment 
philosophy of the CRPD. It is further not obvious that all prisoners will be accepting of 
people with mental disabilities in their communities. If people with such disabilities are to be 
safe, levels of surveillance may be required which are both impractical and raise human 
rights concerns regarding privacy. The overall conditions that exist in many prison 
environments in the world are unlikely to be conducive to the health and well-being of people 
with mental disabilities. This is unsurprising.  The attitude in many parts of the world is that 
prisons are meant to be punitive and, therefore almost by definition may be environments that 
are inappropriate for people with mental disabilities. For these and other reasons, simply 
imposing the CRPD vision onto the SMR without taking into account the local conditions is 
unlikely to have much impact on the ground. It may perhaps still be worth doing- the SMR 
have a symbolic value as statements of good practice, and symbols do matter- but that 
increased level of abstraction will affect the way the SMR are perceived by prison 
administrators. If they become statements of ideals perceived as unattainable and therefore 
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improvements in the short term. 
 
If advocacy for the CRPD ideal is unattainable and potentially counterproductive, 
what other options are available? Consistent with much international law prior to the CRPD, 
the SMRs as they stand tend to favour the removal of people with mental disabilities from 
prisons into psychiatric hospitals and similar environments. This is also problematic. Often, if 
the country is one where prison conditions are lacking, the conditions in psychiatric facilities 
may not be much good either. Further, the move to a psychiatric environment is likely to 
involve the removal of key legal rights. People in psychiatric facilities often lose the right to 
consent to all or some medical treatment, particularly when the treatment relates to their 
mental disorder. That is a significant loss (although it is fair to wonder whether such rights 
are always respected in prison environments either). Admission to a psychiatric facility may 
result in stigmatisation, although once again, it is fair to wonder whether this is more or less 
significant that the stigmatisation that flows from imprisonment. While some programmes in 
the psychiatric environment may well be more suitable for people with mental disabilities, it 
would be wrong to assume that these are either of universally high standards internationally 
or indeed that they are tailored to the needs of the individual. Sometimes they will be, 
sometimes not.   
 
Whether the approach is one of removal of the individual to a psychiatric environment 
or the provision of reasonable accommodation within the standard prison system, 
individualised assessment of the prisoners will be required. Who is to do this? The answer 
has traditionally been that prison medical officers should do this, ideally with administrative 
systems providing those officers with some degree of independence from prison authorities.  
Such officers, the theory has traditionally said, are best placed to determine the needs of 
individuals with mental disabilities. An idealised CRPD approach would question this. The 
Convention rejects the medical model of disability, and it is difficult to see how the use of 
prison medical officers to determine appropriate programmes for people with such disabilities 
will not reintroduce the medical model squarely into the prison environment. While this is 
certainly arguable, it does not address the question of who is meant to do the assessments to 
determine what reasonable accommodations are appropriate.  In wealthy countries, a range of 
possible answers may be available, but the SMR are meant to apply to poor as well as to 
wealthy countries. In poor countries, options are likely to be much more limited. In such 
countries, prison staff such as guards are unlikely to have the requisite training and will also 
potentially be involved in conflicts of intereVW 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needs of the individual prisoner). Prison medical staff may well be the only other practical 
option.  At least in theory, they have some independence from the governance of the prison.  
How real that independence is may well be a fair question, but given the choices available, it 
may be the best option for prisoners with disabilities in the short to mid-term. Again, the 
question arises whether the short-term results warrant a departure from the overarching 
CRPD principle. 
 
The object here is not to advocate for one choice over another in these matters. It is 
rather to note that the choices taken will have advantages and disadvantages in the short and 
long term. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In a sense, the problems identified above are those faced by advocates on a daily 
basis:  the tension between short-term and long-term goals; the difficulties in international 
advocacy in taking into account vastly different geographical, cultural, economic and legal 
contexts; and trade-offs between the ideal and the attainable in negotiations.  The CRPD does 
introduce a different dynamic, however, because it is meant to constitute a break from 
previous international law at least as much as a continuation.  The efficacy of the CRPD will 
therefore depend on its new values and norms ± its new paradigm ± being accepted into the 
daily life not only of people with disabilities but also of politicians, administrators and other 
stakeholders.  A number of its key articles also require the development of new legal forms 
within a wide array of laws to bring about disability-neutral policy.  All of this will take time. 
Notwithstanding the triumphalist language of Kofi Annan with which this article began, we 
are at the beginning of the journey, not the end, and the journey will not be short. 
 
The pressure for reform will therefore need to continue for many years. This is not 
something we can take for granted.  The CRPD is a new Convention, and as a result has been 
µIODYRXURIWKHPRQWK¶VLQFHLWVLQWURGXFWLon. That will not continue. New human rights issues 
will arise, and UN agencies and similar bodies will respond to them as they have to the 
CRPD. If disability rights are to continue to develop, therefore, disability advocates must be 
ready to fight our corner to ensure that the fundamental and ongoing developments to 
disability policy do not slip off international and domestic agendas. 
 
In the course of those fundamental and often long-term reforms, we cannot lose track 
of the immediate needs and human rights violations that affect people with disabilities on a 
daily basis. Addressing those needs in the specific geographic, cultural, and legal contexts in 
which they arise may create tensions with some of the directions of the long-term policy 
reform. Strategies must be developed in individual instances to address those tensions, but 
ignoring immediate needs cannot be viewed as consistent with human rights advocacy. 
